Kádár and the Polish Crisis 1980–1981

The first news of the Polish crisis of 1980-81 reached Hungary just as the Kádár regime had gone past its prime and started on a steady decline, which was to last nearly ten years and end in its collapse. In the summer of 1979, the Hungarian government was forced into a second major price hike after the one that had been imposed in 1974–75 —to be followed by several others; the result was a rise in food prices of nearly 20 per cent, as against a 9 per cent growth in annual wages. Although the price increases did not provoke strikes or any other protests, they nevertheless shocked the public, signalling that the rise in standards of living had come to an end, and that the best that could be hoped for was to maintain the current level. The latest international oil price explosion forced the government to take measures to limit oil imports and to borrow more abroad; the result was that the country's gross foreign debt, standing at $11.5 million in 1980, grew to an alarming $19.5 million by 1985.
János Kádár, who had come to power by the grace of Moscow as a result of the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, had, since 1960, somewhat changed his spots. He showed respect for private life, allowing greater personal freedom within the confines of the system and, most importantly, he guaranteed a continuous and steady rise in living standards. After 1979, the Kádár-leadership gave overriding priority to the latter. With accumulation at a minimum, foreign credits were used to keep consumer prices artificially low and to subsidize inefficient large factories; this strategy, at the price of generating a deficit, was able to secure full employment. Nevertheless, a growing share of public expenditure had to be used to service earlier loans.

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The HSWP, unlike other Socialist-bloc countries which relentlessly attacked the PUWP and its leaders for their “opportunism", passivity and continuous retreat, tried to support their Polish comrades by refraining from criticizing the Polish leadership, either in public or through “party channels". * (The only exception to this rule was a letter sent to the PUWP's Central Committee by the HSWP's Central Committee with János Kádár's signature; this was, however, made necessary by a concrete event, a congress of the trade union Solidarity.) When Leonid Brezhnev phoned the Hungarian party leader at the beginning of the Polish crisis, Kádár explained to him that the best way to handle the situation, in the HSWP's view, was to refrain from “interfering from the outside". Kádár argued that in a rapidly changing scenario such as in Poland, where “various people emerge from within the Polish party leadership as well as from outside the party," it would be embarrassing for both sides if the Hungarian leadership condemned or supported somebody, while the Polish leadership formed an opposing view. When all was said and done, Kádár considered the Polish crisis a “family problem", which should only concern the Soviet-bloc countries, and he consistently represented this view whenever he talked to anyone from the West.**

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On the domestic front, Polish developments made life both easier and more difficult for the Hungarian leadership. They could boast how much better life was in Hungary than in Poland, with all the unrest and shortages of food, services and goods there. They could take pride in the political wisdom of Kádár, which the HSWP's leaders invariably did in their declarations, as did the media. In addition to the impending 25th anniversary of the 1956 “counter-revolution", it was the Polish issue that offered Kádár a good opportunity to draw a positive balance of the HSWP's quarter-of-a-century track record. He could point out that all those mistakes that the Polish leaders had repeatedly committed over the years, he and his comrades had been able to avoid. Indeed, after 1956, the Hungarian leadership was sensible enough to realize that those non- essential privileges and pressures—special shops for party functionaries and the daily obligatory praise of the leaders; the blatant exploitation of power and the hurrah-optimism wholly unfounded and plainly out of keeping with the realities of the economy—irritated people far more than did long-term geopolitical realities (the Soviet army's presence in Hungary or Warsaw Pact membership, for example). Having learned from the mistakes committed immediately before the 1956 Revolution, the leadership established the appropriate organizations—trade unions, Communist Youth Organization, Patriotic People's Front—to mediate between the masses and the party leadership, and this came to be known as socialist democracy. The HSWP's leadership never tried to set themselves up on Olympian heights, nor was there any attempt to build up a personality cult around Kádár. Some kind of a rapport did exist between the single ruling party and society—though a far cry from “trust", the word mentioned in such affectionate tones in party circles. And when it came to the internal affairs of the HSWP itself, the leadership was able to avoid those pitfalls that eventually came to almost completely paralyse the PUWP during and after the strikes of June and August, 1980. In Hungary the policy whereby the resolutions adopted by the Party's top organizations should be presented as unanimous to the outside world, was consistently carried through, rather than merely preached. Similarly, the Party made sure that the idea of “democratic centralism", in other words the incontrovertible execution at the lower levels of the policies formulated at the top, be strictly observed. All this required, however, the absolute authority of János Kádár, who was able to make himself accepted both at home and abroad.
On the debit side, the Polish developments caused great anxiety, within the HSWP's leadership, for they demonstrated a functional disorder within the Socialist camp, which might challenge the domestic politics of the other countries within the bloc. Despite all this, in his address to Parliament in September 1980, repeated in a speech to the Central Committee on October 16, János Kádár declared that the HSWP would not toughen its policies on account of the Polish events: “We have a good deal of valuable experience, which has enabled us to change the practice in almost every area of social life. It is worth bringing up this experience, in its proper course, manner and measure, because it has gained a new timeliness. We set great store on these political achievements. And they even lend a new timeliness to these practices. These achievements, objectives and results, which we have attained in politics and in the life of society, have to be maintained."7 Nevertheless, the Hungarian party leaders were extremely concerned because of the Polish crisis, even though they professed the contrary.*** The Political Committee of the HSWP was of the opinion that the reason why the Polish example had no appeal to people in Hungary was that Hungarians had attained a respectable level of prosperity, which they wanted to protect, and therefore they had something to lose, should any unrest on the Polish scale develop here. Nevertheless, the party leaders were aware that “there are people in [Hungarian] society—not too many—who sympathize with Solidarity, and who would like to see the Polish example spread to Hungary."9 For this reason they thought it necessary to warn the public; in early spring 1981, Kádár repeatedly declared—this time at the Congress of the Patriotic People's Front—that they would defend the achievements of socialism in Hungary against everything and everybody.10 On a different occasion he told the public that “in this tense situation we should treasure and defend our achievements all the more; and as to those who want to agitate and stir up trouble, we must make clear to them that these are the achievements of the people, and that we will allow no one to touch them."11 In connection with the price rises, which became increasingly frequent in Hungary at the time, great care was taken not to provoke reactions similar to those in Poland. In early 1981, shortly after the acrimonious confrontation that had developed between the Polish authorities and Solidarity over the issue of Saturdays off, the five-day working week was introduced in Hungary too, and it was generally believed was done in order as to prevent people from demanding it.

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After the summer of 1981, this propaganda grew into a general anti-Polish campaign, suggesting that Poles in general were good-for-nothing freeloaders, who hated to work. The Hungarian media successfully exploited the fact that, after a period of stagnation, Hungarian living standards were slowly beginning to drop and, as news of strikes in Poland kept coming in all the time, this was to lead some people—in fact a minority–to believe that there was some connection between the two. Things were said, such as “What is the Polish situation going to cost us, Hungarians?";12 “The Poles expect to live off the other Socialist countries!";13 “It is hard work, not strikes, that will improve living and working conditions";14 “It is absurd to stop working and to expect greater handouts, or to keep going on strikes while people in the other Socialist countries work".****
In expressing views like this, the Hungarian media played a major part by consistently misinforming the Hungarian public about the true causes of the Polish crisis. The media suggested that it was not the catastrophic policies of the previous years that brought on the strikes in the Summer of 1980, but the reverse: Solidarity was to blame for the shortages, because the trade union, guided by its own selfish motives and “following the orders of the subversive forces of Imperialism", organized strikes in quick succession. What the mass media suggested to the Hungarian public was that they should be content with what they had, as their desire for freedom would only lead to chaos and to a drastic deterioration of their living standards. Party propaganda was quick to seize every opportunity to blacken the Poles by disseminating false and malicious stereotypes about them.

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In the course of 1980 and 1981, three top-ranking Polish politicians visited Budapest to report on the Polish situation and to listen to the advice of the Hungarian comrades. The first was Emil Wojtaszek, alternate member of the Political Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee, who arrived in September 1980; he was followed in November by another Central Committee Secretary, Tadeusz Grabski; last to arrive was Stanislaw Kania, First Secretary of the PUWP's Central Committee, who came in March 1981. After August 1980, the Polish leadership looked upon Hungary as the blueprint they wanted to copy. Kania and his colleagues, who would have liked to adapt elements of Kádár's policy to Polish conditions—naturally without any hope of success, as they had neither the time nor the patience to stick to a course of effective actions—listened to the views of the First Secretary of the HSWP's Central Committee very attentively. Kádár was genuinely respected in Poland, and the PUWP tried to exploit the political asset of his name—which, how-ever, was just then beginning to lose its value, slowly at first and then more rapidly. Both Kania and, immediately after December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski, asked for, and were given, a detailed account of the HSWP's “consolidation" programme in Hungary after November 4, 1956. The Polish leadership also tried to turn to good account the memories of the Soviet military intervention of 1956 in Hungary, still vividly remembered in Poland. In October 1981 they decided to screen a Hungarian documentary film on the “1956 counter-revolution" under the title “This Is How It Happened", with the aim of intimidat-ing the Poles by recalling the “Hungarian scenario".
While the PUWP wanted some general advice, the Hungarians always emphasized—bearing in mind the lessons of the 1950s, when a perfect copy of the Soviet system had been introduced in Hungary—that mere copying of a model was useless, specific local features had to be taken into account at all times and for this reason they declined the invitation to give advice, and only offered to share their experience.***** On every occasion, the Hungarian leaders emphasized to their Polish guests the importance of drawing up a concise and clearly-worded programme, one that the PUWP's members could rally to and the broad masses desirous of “order and peace"—the ordinary sympathizers of socialism—could support. At the same time, unity within the party leadership must be achieved, and that would eventually filter through to the party itself. “The state of society mirrors the state of the party. Once there is unity in the party, it can also be achieved in society. In our own experience, a resolution is not possible without a committed and united leadership. A large party membership is no guarantee of quality. Cutting back on quantity might produce a force many times more effective," Károly Németh, a member of the HSWP Political Committee told Grabski in November 1980.22 Non-party members must not be allowed to interfere in the PUWP's internal affairs; of similar importance was the need for the Polish party to carry out an accurate and thorough analysis of the events. This was up to the Polish Communists, and the business of drawing the right conclusions was theirs, too; “it is very difficult to give intelligent advice from the sidelines".23 Kádár also told Wojtaszek that “it is not enough to promise workers beautiful things in the future; they have to get something today. They must feel that socialism is not only for the future, but that it already works for them today."

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The discussion of the Polish situation was the single item on the agenda. The Hungarian delegation was led by János Kádár, whose speech was markedly different from those of the hard-liners, Honecker, Zhivkov and Husak. These three strongly advocated the establishment of order by force, as opposed to Kádár who repeatedly argued for a political solution. He reiterated that the Polish Communists themselves had to resolve the crisis in a socialist way. The condition for this was that the party hold onto its leading position, that the socialist constitutional establishment be preserved, and that the people's democracy be maintained, in which the control of the mass media, as an integral part of political power, played an important role. He warned the Polish comrades to distance themselves from their earlier mistakes, without focusing, however, too much attention on a search for scapegoats. In connection with this he pointed out that “it was only in 1962 that we established the responsibility" of Mátyás Rákosi and his associates, i.e. when they were expelled from the HSWP. He also emphasized that the platform from which the PUWP should launch its campaign must be chosen so as to project its resolve. Therefore, the Polish party should make it clear that it would “continue its efforts to avoid bloodshed, but there were certain things which it was prepared to defend to the last." He strongly believed that “at least half of the population would rally to the support of a clear and straightforward political line," not only the Communists but also “all the progressive and patriotic forces, even including many of the church-goers." Finally, Kádár recalled the words of encouragement of the Soviet comrades during November 1956 (at a time when he could rely only on Soviet military forces and the law enforcement agencies of the Rákosi regime), “who said to the Hungarian Communists that they were stronger than they think" and “the same applies to the Polish Communists now".

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When Kádár recalled the events of twenty-five years earlier, he unconsciously drew a parallel between the Hungarian situation of 1956 and the Polish developments of 1980–81. Weighing the similarities and the dissimilarities, he tried to find analogies suggesting that the Polish leadership could rightly expect popular support, once it had made up its mind “to restore order". In this vein, he declared at the March 26, 1981 session of the Central Committee that, although the situation was bad enough both in Poland and within the PUWP, he was still confident that everything would turn out well in the end, for he continued to believe that the socialist cause had many supporters in Poland. To justify his optimism, he recalled the Budapest May Day parade of 1957 (only six months after the crushing of the Revolution), at which nearly half a million people turned up, “pledging support to both the socialist idea and our leadership and expressing their readiness to take part in the fight for social consolidation".****** “No slogans or organization could have mobilized or gathered up a huge mass such as that which [on that day] responded to the call of our reorganized party. I am deeply convinced that in today's Poland, too, the supporters of socialism are in the majority."

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It was this “Message" that prompted the HSWP's Central Committee to write the letter mentioned above, which was signed by János Kádár and was addressed to the Central Committee of the PUWP, and personally to its First Secretary. Patterned on another letter addressed to the PUWP, one that had been written in June of the same year by the Central Committee of the Soviet party and therefore establishing a rather unusual deviation from accustomed practice, this document expressed the concern that the HSWP leadership felt in the wake of the Solidarity congress. The Hungarian party's main motive behind writing the letter was the determination “to direct attention to the dangers threatening both the Polish people and the entire community of socialist countries", at the same time urging the PUWP leadership to take a firmer course of action.30 After concluding that lately in Poland “it was the enemies of socialism, not its supporters, who were on the offensive, and they were bent on a head-on collision course in their attempt to seize power," the Hungarian leaders voiced their fears concerning the effects on Hungarians: “For us, too, it is now becoming increasingly difficult to answer the questions of our people, showing genuine concern as well as growing impatience, all boiling down to the question of where Poland is heading and how long the dangerous escalation of attempts and actions aiming to overturn the socialist order can continue,…" This was followed by a discussion of the concrete event that prompted the letter: “We have been especially disturbed by the atmosphere at the congress of the trade union Solidarity by the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet agitation taking place there, and by the unbridled demagogy of the ringleaders trying to mislead and to beguile the working class, who want a correction of mistakes, not the elimination of socialism. It is obvious that determined measures must be taken to counter the attack, which scorns and jeopardizes the results that the people of Poland have achieved in sweat and blood, and which raises the flag of destruction and anarchy in Poland's difficult situation, instead of striving for social reconciliation and constructive programmes. [...] In effect, Solidarity's provocative “message" addressed to the workers of the socialist countries is nothing but an attempt to transfer the same unreasonable and irresponsible demagogy to the international scene—obviously suggested by the international reaction in order to turn the peoples of socialist countries against one another." Finally, the HSWP's leadership drew the following conclusions: “Strongly upholding our earlier views, we believe that it has now become more urgent than ever that, by uniting, mobilizing and activating the Polish Communists, the Polish patriots and all the forces ready to work for a socialist resolution of the problems, the road to counter-revolution be blocked."

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In any case, by autumn 1981 the Hungarian party, too, was in favour of urgent action; and when Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981 (translated as a “state of emergency" in Hungarian reports), this was indeed greeted with relief and whole-hearted approval by the Hungarian leadership. The Secretariat of the HSWP was convened on the very same day, and in a two-day-long session it passed a motion to respond to General Jaruzelski's appeal by sending economic aid rapidly. The Secretariat approved of “János Kádár's telegramme, in which he had assured Comrade W. Jaruzelski of our support"; they also agreed on releasing an announcement of similar content through the Hungarian Press Agency, the precise wording of which was to be approved by the Secretariat. They explicitly demanded that “our instruction to allow Poles working in our country to take 5 kilogrammes of meat in their luggage on their return home must be mentioned, along with our permission to spend a part of their earnings in Hungary." In addition, the Secretariat ordered that “in informing the public, the Hungarian media should rely primarily on material received from the Polish press agency."
On the whole, Hungarians felt a kind of relief on hearing the news that martial law had been imposed in Poland. The majority of people—or rather of those who held an opinion—thought that if law and order was established along the Vistula, life would become easier back home, too. Naturally, there were some people (mostly among the intelligentsia and university students, and also within the emerging Hungarian opposition), who, in one form or another, protested against Jaruzelski's move; there was even a relief campaign in support of the Poles and a distribution of some leaflets at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. However, the general opinion was best summed up in a “public morale report," compiled for the HSWP's Central Committee: “The public understood the need to impose martial law in Poland. Many people thought that the move was unavoidable; it was provoked by the forces of anti-socialism; the operation was carried out efficiently and at the last minute. In most people's view this should have been done months ago. Among the intelligentsia the prevailing opinion is that the action had to be delayed until the forces of the counter-revolution exposed themselves thoroughly: the timing was right from the viewpoint of foreign politics and Polish domestic politics alike. [...] In connection with the suspension of the right to assembly, some people resented the fact that it did not apply to religious assemblies. Many of them were afraid that this would enable the counter-revolutionary elements to use religious events for their own purposes. [...] Many thought that the socialist countries, too, had to send aid to alleviate shortages in Poland: the earlier reservations surrounding the issue eased off and anti-Polish demonstrations lost ground."

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* : As rapporteur of the issue at the December 2, 1980 session of the HSWP Central Committee, András Gyenes, Secretary of the Central Committee, used the following words to express the same policy: “In our statements we do not criticize the measures and methods thought necessary by the Polish leadership, and we use every opportunity to confirm our solidarity with them in their difficult struggle." (MOL, 288. f. 4/177.)

** : János Kádár expressed this view at the October 16, 1980 meeting of the HSWP's Central Committee: “The imperialists are right: they will never get Poland back, as long as the Earth is round and it is spinning around its axis; never again will there be capitalism in that country. This is a Polish problem, they must deal with it; we should use every opportunity to help them, and sometimes this is done most intelligently by not interfering in their disputes. We must do everything in our power to avoid any outside interference with Polish problems. And we shall continue to represent this view in the future." (MOL, 288. f. 4/174.) Actually, Kádár himself used the expression “family problem", on various occasions, including the March 26, 1981 session of the HSWP's Central Committee. (MOL, 288. f. 12/217.)

*** : Sándor Gáspár, a member of the Political Committee and the President of the National Council of Trade Unions, said at the Central Committee's meeting of October 16, 1980: “On account of the Polish events we have reason neither to panic nor to do anything. We have no need for this. We have to be resolved on continuing the same policies that we started 20 years ago, in this regard, too." To this Kádár added: “The imperialists try to convince the world that all the socialist countries are nervous, they are in trouble, they are forced into action. In our own reactions, and even in our internal affairs, as well as in the public, we must demonstrate somehow that we are on a set course. That is what we have to protect: we are on a set course and we want to develop this." (MOL, 288. f. 4/174.) The same was expressed, again by Kádár, at the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries on December 5, 1980: “The Imperialists claim that the other socialist countries are afraid of the Polish epidemic. On the domestic front the events give us little concern; we must approach the issue more as a shared international problem." (MOL, 288. F. 5/815.)

**** : MOL, 288. f. 12/216. At the October 16, 1980 session of the HSWP's Central Committee, just two months after the strikes, János Kádár summed up the Hungarian reactions to the Polish strikes as follows: “The Communists, hundreds of thousands of responsible people in the Hungarian People's Republic, are naturally anxious and worried about the future of socialism in Poland. This fact alone is of great concern to the people. And I think it is a good reaction that the Polish situation concerns us. But we must say, Comrades, that it also concerns the public at large. This state of affairs—all information points to this effect—is healthy and good. The general attitude is responsible and calm in Hungary; the population is worried about the Poles, about the future of socialism. Naturally, the politically less mature once again say things like 'I pray to God, nothing like this will ever happen to us!', 'Now we shall have to pay for this, again! They are on strike and we shall have to bail them out!' Broadly speaking, this was the reaction. I think, this is how one can sum things up." (MOL, 288. f. 4/174.)

***** : At the October 16, 1980 session of the HSWP's Central Committee, Kádár explained why the HSWP was reluctant to give advice and only offered to share its experience: “It was Mao who educated me during a great debate, when he once said—and I think he was right on this occasion, as even he was right sometimes—that it was not the advisor who would be called to account, but the person who took the advice. I think this is a correct rule." (MOL, 288. f. 4/174.)

****** : Kádár's entire analogy—with regard to 1956— is extreme over-simplification and mostly untrue.

Hungarian Quarterly, Autumn 1998